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Abstract 
The year 2010 inaugurated a tumultuous period for a range of countries in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa. Protests compelling for democratization culminated in violent clashes 
between rebels and authoritarian regimes across the region. In response to the escalation of 
violence in Libya, an alliance of countries established a no-fly zone for halting the exorbitant 
regime violence against the rebels and the population. Shortly after, NATO took over 
command. A similar intervention in Syria did not occur, in spite of the widespread human 
rights violations and grave human suffering. A comparison between the cases of Libya and 
Syria sheds light on the factors that shaped the different international community responses to 
the conflicts and also contributes to the greater puzzle of why states intervene in some 
atrocities but not in others. This study found that a prime factor impacting humanitarian 
intervention occurrence in Libya and Syria is the UN Security Council’s task to provide 
authorization within a context of disputed legality of humanitarian interventions. In addition, 
it is concluded that UNSC member’s positions with respect to intervening were guided by 
their political interests and to a lesser extent by their economic interests. Finally, the 
anticipated outcomes of the two humanitarian intervention scenarios influenced intervention 
behavior, which explains why only one intervention was conducted. All these factors are 
indispensable components of an inclusive explanation for the different responses to the civil 
wars in Libya and Syria. 
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“... The foreign policy of any government ... is a prolongation of 
its domestic policy. This is all too often forgotten in a period of 'summit' 
meetings, when the public is led to believe that three or four Big Men 
solve, or fail to solve, the world's predicaments according to whether they 
have or do not have the wisdom, the good will, or the magic wand needed 
for their task.” 
Isaac Deutscher, Great Contests: Russia and the West 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The year 2010 marked the beginning of a series of uprisings against authoritarian regimes in 
the Arab world, popularly referred to as ‘the Arab Spring’. Violent clashes between regimes 
and rebel forces occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.
1
 Some other 
countries experienced less intense violence in what is generally perceived to be a rejection of 
authoritarianism and a demand for democracy.
2
 Many initially celebrated the perceived end 
of authoritarianism and oppression across the Middle East and Northern Africa but the 
revolutions came at a high cost as many people suffered and died in the struggle for greater 
political freedom. Some protests led to regime change, some were brutally oppressed by 
regime forces and other clashes between rebels and regimes led to stalemates that still exist 
today.  
One of the regimes that clashed with rebel forces was that of Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi who had been ruling his country for 42 years. Gaddafi vigorously oppressed the 
protesting forces and he made his mission to remain in power explicit by pledging “to chase 
down the cockroaches and rats who had taken up arms against him inch by inch, room by 
room, home by home, and alleyway by alleyway, person by person.”3 
Also Syria was hit hard by the Arab Spring and its ongoing consequences. The unrest 
in the country commenced in 2011 and sought the removal of the al-Assad rule. Up until 
                                                          
1
 Scott Williamson and Caroline Abadeer, “Protest, Uprising & Regime Change in the Arab Spring,” 
Muftah (blog), January 28, 2014, http://muftah.org/protest-uprising-revolution-regime-change-explaining-
outcomes-arab-spring/#.VMKtPkeG9o7.  
2
 Mary-Jane Deeb, “Arab Spring: Libya’s Second Revolution,” in The Arab Spring: Change and 
Resistance in the Middle East, eds. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 68. 
3
 Peter Bouckaert, “Death of a dictator: bloody Vengeance in Sirtre”, Human Rights Watch, October 
2012, 4, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya1012webwcover_0_0.pdf. 
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today, none of the conflict parties have managed to claim decisive victory and the country is 
thorn by the recent years of ongoing violence. It has caused high numbers of casualties and 
many people were injured. By the end of 2013, some 6.5 million Syrians were displaced and 
more than two million people had fled the country.
4
 
 
France, the UK and the US intervened in Libya on March 19, 2011, and soon after NATO 
took over command over the mission. “Operation Unified Protector consisted of three 
elements: an arms embargo, a no-fly-zone and actions to protect civilians from attack or the 
threat of attack.”5 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 provided the legal foundation for the 
intervention after receiving affirmative votes of permanent Security Council members 
France, the UK and the US, while China and Russia abstained from voting and thus 
facilitated an intervention by not using their veto power.
6
 
Resolution 1973 was preceded by the unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, which 
made explicit mentioning of Libya’s obligations under the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P.7 
Mohammed Nuruzzaman argues that the Libyan failure to uphold its responsibilities provided 
Western leaders with the grounds for justifying intervention under R2P for the first time.
8
 
NATO involvement enabled the rebel forces to prevail in the battle, which eventually led to 
the capture and killing of Gadhafi on October 20, 2011.
9
 Francesco Francioni and Christine 
Bakker view the resolute response to ‘Libya’ as in sharp contrast with “the prolonged inertia 
of the international community vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis.”10 It was established that chemical 
weapons were used in the conflict by the Syrian regime, leading to the unanimous adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution 2118 in September 2013, calling for the destruction of 
                                                          
4
 “Syria Crisis: UN Launches Record $6.5bn Aid Appeal,” BBC News Middle East, December 16, 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25398012. 
5
 “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats,” NATO, Brussels, 2011, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf.  
6
 “Security Council Approves ‘No-fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to 
Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favor With 5 Abstentions”, United Nations, March 17, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. 
7
 R2P is an instrument designed to addresses the absence of an adequate normative system for 
international community involvement in cases of human rights abuses and grave human suffering. The principle 
provides that if a state fails to uphold its responsibility to protect its citizens, this responsibility shifts to the 
international community and thus an intervention may be justified under R2P. Gareth Evans and Mohamed 
Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, The International Development Research Center, 2001). 
8
 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Revisiting ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after Libya and Syria,” E-
International Relations (blog), March 8, 2014, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/08/revisiting-responsibility-to-
protect-after-libya-and-syria/. 
9
 Bouckaert, “Death of a dictator: bloody vengeance in Sirtre”, 23-25.  
10
 Francesco Francioni and Christine Bakker, “Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian Intervention and 
Human Rights: Lessons From Libya and Mali,” Transworld, working paper 15, (2013): 3, 
http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_15.pdf.      
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Syria’s chemical weapons. The Syrian regime cooperated and its chemical weapons arsenal 
was destroyed.
11
 In spite of this response to the use of chemical weapons, the conflict rages 
on today and so do the human rights violations and humanitarian crisis.      
 
It is a striking phenomenon that the people of one country receive sufficient international 
community assistance for stopping the mass killing campaigns in their country while the 
people of another country do not. This is especially so in a time in which statements and talks 
on reciprocal international community responsibilities, such as R2P, dominate global politics. 
Scholars are entangled in widespread debate on the factors causing international 
community willingness or refusal to intervene in humanitarian crises. Among them is Roland 
Paris, who explains inconsistent responses to be rooted in the disputed legality of 
humanitarian intervention and R2P, because of which the use of the concepts backfire on 
both interveners and on the concept itself.
12
 Robert Pape found asserts that states fear 
intervention costs to run out of hand, by which a humanitarian intervention can threaten the 
welfare of the intervening state’s citizens.13  
 
The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is why the Libyans were saved and the 
Syrians are not, hence the title of this thesis. Do characteristics or shortcoming of the 
international legal framework concerning humanitarian interventions contribute to an 
explanation for the difference in responding to Libya and Syria? Can the difference between 
the responses be traced back to the interests and motives of the most important potential 
interveners and the opponents of intervening? Finally, can differences in conflict dynamics 
and complexity, thereby simply causing one conflict to constitute a greater challenge to 
resolve, explain why an intervention emerged in only one of the two cases? Finding answers 
to these questions is important as it sheds light on which factors influence decision-making 
processes on humanitarian interventions. It should be noted that the scope of this thesis is 
limited to the identification of answers to these questions, rather than that it aims to evaluate 
the success of the Libyan intervention or advocates a certain policy or strategy for the conflict 
in Syria. What it will do is provide suggestions for further research on the basis of the 
findings.    
                                                          
11
 Carsten Stahn, “Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment: on ‘Red Lines’ 
and ‘Blurred Lines’,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 955 
12
 Roland Paris, “The Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive 
Humanitarian Action,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 5 (2014): 593, doi: 10.1080/13533312.2014.963322 
13
 Robert Pape, “When Duty Calls: a Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention,” International 
Security 37, no.1 (2012): 80. 
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In order to find answers to the puzzle of the different responses, I investigate which 
factors drive a state or an alliance of states, to conduct a humanitarian intervention, either 
with or without UN approval, or to refrain from doing so. A definition of humanitarian 
intervention that is provided by Tom J. Farer is used for the conduct of this research. He 
defines humanitarian intervention as “The use of force across state borders by a state (or 
group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than the own citizens, without the permission 
of the government of the state within whose territory force is applied.”14 
The literature review explores and studies different theoretical explanations for 
divergences in humanitarian intervention behavior. The first major issue addressed is the role 
of the international legal framework and its inherent imperfections. J.L. Holzgrefe argues that 
contrasting provisions within the plentitude of international legal and normative documents 
on the matter facilitate inconsistent state behavior in general behavior and also with respect to 
humanitarian interventions in particular.
15
 The second issue pointed out is the potential role 
of the interests and motives of potential interveners and opponents of intervention. This 
discussion draws from Robert Pattison’s work on the dichotomy between self-interested 
motives vs. humanitarian considerations as the perceived driving forces behind intervention 
plans. Douglas Lemke and Patrick Regan are among the authors who represent one side of 
the debate, asserting that states are eventually pursuing their own interests.
16
 Constructivist 
Martha Finnemore contrasts this view; she contends that humanitarian aspirations are 
sufficient for guiding state behavior concerning intervening.
17
 The third focus is the role of 
the anticipated feasibility of intervention objectives in light of the capacity or willingness of 
international community members to commit to a rescue mission. Nicolas Wheeler and Alex 
Bellamy assert that the difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, to make reliable estimations on 
the impact of an intervention and the financial burden it imposes upon the intervener causes 
reluctance to get involved.
18
  
                                                          
14
 Tom J. Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11,” in Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, eds. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 55. 
15
 J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas,” eds. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 8-43. 
16
 Douglas Lemke and Patrick M. Regan, “Intervention as Influence,” in The Scourge of War: New 
Extensions on an Old Problem, ed. Paul F. Diehl (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 164. 
17
 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention (Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
18
 Nicolas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics.” In The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (2
nd
 edition), ed. John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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The literature review facilitated the formulation of three hypotheses, of which each 
potentially contributes to an inclusive explanation for the different international community 
responses to Libya and Syria. The resulting hypotheses test for the role of political and 
economic interests and motives, for the impact of anticipated intervention outcomes and for 
the influence of relevant features to the international legal framework.  
The study is a full-fledged two-case comparison between the cases of Libya and 
Syria, as this approach is anticipated to deliver the most insightful answers to the puzzling 
issue of different international community responses to the two cases, and presumably also to 
the general phenomenon of perceived inconsistent humanitarian intervention behavior.  
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2. Literature and theoretical framework 
Literature review 
The following literature review briefly addresses the definition, purpose and potential of 
humanitarian intervention. Thereafter the existing academic efforts to identify and explain 
factors that impact humanitarian intervention behavior are introduced and discussed.  
 
 Humanitarian intervention: definition, purpose and potential 
There are different definitions of the concept humanitarian intervention in circulation but 
most do not dispute the core aspects. A definition that is often used is provided by J.L. 
Holzgrefe who explains the phenomenon as “the threat or use of force across state borders by 
a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than the own citizens, without the 
permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”19 Tom J. Farer adopts this 
definition in his work but leaves out ‘the threat of force’ and thus limits the use of the term to 
the application of force only.
20
 Robert Pattison identifies four conditions of humanitarian 
intervention. He contends that a humanitarian intervention must be a forcible (military) 
intervention without ‘invitation’ and that it must be carried out during the occurrence of grave 
human suffering and not after. In addition, he argues that a humanitarian purpose must be 
present and that humanitarian interventions must be conducted by an external power.
21
  
Humanitarian intervention is an intervention of modern times, nor is its disputed 
status. For example, Sean Murphy elaborates on Hugo the Grotius’ 17th century attempts to 
promote the idea of protecting nationals of other states. The Grotius argued for kings to have 
“the right for demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against 
themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them 
but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any person whatsoever.”22 
Many scholars, among them Klejda Mulaj and Muzaffer Yilmaz, argue that the humanitarian 
intervention doctrine has been rather invisible during the Cold War era. The end of the Cold 
War is explained to have inaugurated a new period for humanitarian intervention as with the 
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 Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate,” 18. 
20
 Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11,” 55. 
21
 James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25 - 27 
22
 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: the United Nations in an Evolving World Order. 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996), 44. 
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disappearance of the main ideological dividing line, intra-state conflict became the main 
threat to peace.
23
 
 
In spite of the early conceptualization of humanitarian intervention, the concept remains 
controversial and contested today. Jerry M’bartee Lucola argues that opponents of the 
concept have rather obscure motives; “Most states that reject the principle of humanitarian 
intervention are at the forefront of human rights abuses … and hide behind the concept of 
sovereignty.”24 The scholarly debate on humanitarian interventions is frequently given the 
shape of a tradeoff between the protection of individuals on the one hand and the upholding 
of the sovereignty principle on the other. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
addressed the issue by rhetorically questioning if sovereignty is really such an important 
value at stake in this discussion. He stated that “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – 
to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?”25  
Roland Paris identifies five structure problems inherent to preventive humanitarian 
action that mark the concept’s limited potential. These are the mixed motives problem, the 
counterfactual problem, the conspicuous harm problem, the end-state problem and the 
inconsistency problem
26
. The mixed motives problem refers to a perceived dichotomy 
between altruistic humanitarian objectives vs. self-interested objectives as providing the true 
underlying motivation for intervening. The mentioning of the counterfactual problem 
addresses the impossibility of evaluating humanitarian interventions’ relative successes, 
noting that the results of non-executed alternative policy options need to be imagined. The 
conspicuous harm problem refers to the issue of obvious costs in combination with 
immeasurable benefits of interventions and the end-state problem touches upon the question 
of how to disengage after intervening without recreating a situation similar to prior to the 
intervention. Finally, the inconsistency problem concerns the perceived imperfection of 
                                                          
23
 Klejda Mulaj, “Dilemmas of Reacting to Mass Atrocities: Humanitarian Intervention to End Violent 
Conflict in the Western Balkans,” Democracy and Security 7, no. 2 (2011): ?, doi: 
10.1080/17419166.2011.572783; Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, “Intra-state conflict in the post Cold-war era,” 
International Journal on World Peace 24, no. 4 (2007): 140. 
24
 Jerry M’bartee Locula, “The Theory and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and the Interest of 
Western Powers: Liberia, Darfur, Rwanda, Iraq, and Libya,” University for Peace and Conflict Monitor, last 
modified may 3, 2011, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=796#_ftn3.  
25
 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 35. 
26
 Paris, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problem of Preventive Humanitarian 
Action,” 570. 
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norms, causing that interventions are established in some cases and not in other cases. Paris 
concludes that such inconsistency heavily impacts the credibility of humanitarian 
interventions.
27
 Klejda Murai summarizes the consequences of the controversies inherent to 
humanitarian interventions, stating, “The complexities of humanitarian intervention insofar as 
its implementation is concerned seem to suggest that intervention is doomed if it happens 
(because of the stringent criteria applied for its justification) and doomed if it does not 
happen (because of inaction in the face of large-scale atrocities).”28  
 
Research towards potential factors of influences on humanitarian intervention behavior, 
causing or promoting policy decisions for intervention and for non-intervention respectively, 
yielded three main explanatory factors.  
 
 The disputed legality of humanitarian interventions and the role of the UNSC 
Antony D’Amato states “International law only exists in the sense that nation-state officials 
in their international dealings refer to it, both by direct literal reference and by the use of legal 
argumentation in claim-conflict situations.”29 Holzgrefe agrees by stating that the sources of 
international law are generally stipulated as in accordance with the Statue of the International 
Court of Justice.
30
 Article 38(1) of the Statute reads that the sources are “(a) international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law…” 
Problems arise when attempting to determine more specifically the content of 
international law by looking at international conventions and state practice, as prescribed by 
the ICJ. Holzgrefe observes that the essence of international agreements is disputed because 
of the contrasting nature of different international conventions, whereby the occurrence of 
different interpretations is facilitated.
31
 Antony D’Amato addresses the difficulty of 
determining the content of international custom. He explains that observing state behavior 
does not necessarily lead to knowledge on the content of customary law. He views custom to 
be rooted in state beliefs rather than in state practice, and argues that states may not always 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., 571 – 579, 593 
28
 Mulaj, “Dilemmas of Reacting to Mass Atrocities: Humanitarian Intervention to End Violent 
Conflict in the Western Balkans,” 143. 
29
 Antony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1971), 33. 
30
 Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate,” 36-37. 
31
 Ibid., 38-43. 
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act in accordance to their true convictions if certain (vital) state interests are at stake.
32
 Ian 
Hurd applies the notion of ambiguity of international law to the question of humanitarian 
intervention legality, stating “There is no consensus over the legality of intervention, in part 
because there is no consensus over the sources of international law more generally.”33 Hurd 
concludes that the intervention problem is inseparable from the questions that have been at 
the heart of international law for centuries. Holzgrefe downplays the controversy somewhat 
by carefully suggesting that the sources of law may be subject to a certain order of authority. 
He provides the example that for claiming there to exist a ‘right’ or ‘obligation’ to intervene, 
one is required to conduct a rather selective reading of the documents of international law.
34
  
The argument for humanitarian intervention ambiguity is countered by scholars who 
contend the phenomenon to be formally sheer legal or illegal under international law. 
Advocates of humanitarian intervention illegality often refer to the UN Charter as the primary 
source of law, and put forward the numerous restrictions on the use of force that it contains.
35
 
It is argued that the brief mentioning of ‘faith in human rights’ in the Charter’s preamble 
cannot be read as to the restrictions on the use of force that are set out in the remainder of the 
legal document.  
Innocent Okoronye and V.O.S. Okeke advocate the contrasting view and state “The 
right to interfere in the territorial integrity and political independence of a state by another 
state on humanitarian grounds had been firmly established under customary international 
law.”36 They deem the prohibition of the use of force as stated in the UN Charter not to 
prohibit humanitarian interventions as such interventions were consolidated long before the 
Charter was written, and also, the Charter is explained to not regulate all uses of force in 
international relations.
37
  
 
As provided in article 42 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council is charged with the task 
of authorizing interventions as international law forbids the use of force unless it concerns an 
act of self-defense or has received UNSC approval. Wheeler and Bellamy explain that it is 
                                                          
32
 D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law, 73. 
33
 Ian Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World,” Ethics 
and International Affairs 25 (2011): 311. 
34
 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 49. 
35
 UN Charter article 2(1) emphasizes the principle of sovereignty and equality between states, article 
2(4) explicitly prohibits the use of force against other states and article 2(7) determines that the content of the 
Charter does not authorize action within the jurisdiction of a state. Articles 42 and 51 provide two exceptions to 
the rules of article 2. These are Security Council authorization and the necessity of self-defense respectively.   
36
 Innocent Okoronye and V.O.S. Okeke, “An Appraisal of Humanitarian Intervention Under 
International Law, ” Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 2 (2011): 147. 
37
 Ibid., 146-147. 
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subject of debate if humanitarian intervention should be exempted from the general ban on 
the use of force.
38
 The reason for this is the perception that the UNSC’s role in determining 
legality constitutes an undesirable coincidence of politics and la. The permanent SC members 
have been accused of failing to sufficiently disregard the own interests in UNSC decision-
making on humanitarian issues. Eve Massingham criticizes this state of affairs, stating “Even 
if you argue that the United Nations Charter legally supports a wider use of force for 
humanitarian ends …, the reality is that, only when and where it meets the self-interest 
criteria of those nations with the capacity to protect vulnerable populations will such 
populations be protected.”39 
 
 The role of political and economic interests and motivations 
James Pattison views motives and intentions to play determining roles in decision-making 
processes on whether interventions are conducted or not.
40
 He distinguishes between two 
issues of relevance concerning intentions: the role of the nature of intentions and the role of 
the successful political communications of intentions. The former issue, the nature of 
intentions, is by Pattison explained as a dichotomy between humanitarian considerations vs. 
self-interested motives as the true underlying rationale for humanitarian interventions.
41
 This 
dichotomy forms a major dividing line between scholarly explanations. Douglas Lemke and 
Patrick Regan advocate a realist perspective on the matter, emphasizing that states are 
ultimately self-interested entities and their highest purpose is to protect the own citizens.
42
 
Constructivist Martha Finnemore asserts that a state’s aspirations to improve humanitarian 
circumstances elsewhere in the world can suffice as a foundation for humanitarian action
43
. 
Jon Western arrives at a similar conclusion and states that the promotion of peace and 
humanitarian goals is a viable intervention motivation.
44
 Theodora Gizelis and Kristin Kosek 
argue for the existence of a trend break in time with the end of the Cold War. They assert that 
“Where states traditionally have intervened in the affairs of other states to defend either their 
strategic or private interests, humanitarian concerns, such as preventing human suffering in 
                                                          
38
 Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics.” 
39
 Eve Massingham, “Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?” International Review of the 
Red Cross 91, no. 876 (2009): 831. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000196. 
40
 Pattison, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?” 155. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Lemke and Regan, “Intervention as Influence”, 164. 
43
 Finnemore, The purpose of intervention. 
44
 Jon Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. 
Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002). 
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severe civil wars, have increasingly become cited as a rationale for involvement in other 
states.”45  
Some may question the relevance of studying state’s true intentions given that real life 
action may rescue people but mere beliefs are unlikely to do so. Robert Pattison and also 
Sang Kim counter this argument, contending that humanitarian interventions rooted in self-
interest enjoy greater dedication and thus the chances of their actual realization increase or 
decrease depending on the intervener’s interests and motives.46 This argument contrasts the 
findings of Seung-Whan Choi, whose quantitative analysis of US intervention behavior 
between 1981 and 2005 led him to conclude that US interventions have been rooted in 
humanitarian considerations and the preserving of liberal norms and moral values, and not in 
motivations fuelled by national interests.
47
  
 
 The role of anticipated intervention outcomes and costs 
An important question is if one should conduct a humanitarian intervention if it is uncertain 
that an improvement of the humanitarian situation will occur. Skeptics say that in case of 
such uncertainty interventions should not carry the humanitarian label as the lack of a 
credible humanitarian foundation for the policy plan makes it a ‘regular’ war. Bellamy 
supports this line of reasoning by asserting that it must be successfully demonstrated by 
decision-makers that “The overall good that an intervention will produce is likely (we can 
never know for certain) to outweigh the overall evil that the war will produce. This involves 
demonstrating that intervention is a humanitarian necessity, that the chosen strategy will not 
produce more harm than good, and that once war is over a just peace will be restored in the 
region.”48 On a practical level, Pattison notes that humanitarian intervention objectives need 
to be viewed as convincingly feasible in order to gain sufficient domestic support for 
intervening in a humanitarian crisis elsewhere in the world.
49
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Next to the difficulty of estimating intervention outcomes, the difficulty of estimating 
intervention costs prior to intervening is argued to play a role. Michael Barnett and others 
explain that it was learned from hard lessons in the past that a humanitarian intervention must 
include a post-intervention commitment and strategy. “Nearly 50 percent of all countries 
receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years.”50 Thus, halting violence 
should be seen as only one of the objectives of modern humanitarian missions as a failure to 
establish positive peace may lead to relapse into violence. The post-intervention commitment 
requirement is an example of a factor further complicating the making of reliable cost 
estimations, as it introduces that both short-term and long-term objectives must be included in 
policy trade-offs attempting to enhancing peace and security.  
Pape says that in case of “Absent serious discussion of costs, opponents can more 
easily argue against any moral action for fear of creating a precedent for limitless obligations 
that would jeopardize the wealth, power, and security of the intervening state.”51 Thus, a 
humanitarian intervention for which it is relatively difficult to estimate the necessary scope 
and the thereto-connected price tag, is likely to be unpopular among foreign policy decision-
makers. It is only logic that a similar unpopularity is attributed to intervention plans for which 
the costs are deemed too high. High costs, either in straightforward monetary terms or in the 
form of e.g. negative domestic or international political consequences, may cause an 
intervention to directly contrast the self-interest of a potential intervener.
52
 
 
The gap 
The literature on humanitarian intervention behavior identifies many factors that may 
contribute to an explanation for humanitarian intervention behavior. Among the most 
prominent ones are political interests and motives. In addition, anticipated intervention 
outcomes and the estimated costs of interventions are viewed to play a role. Finally, a set of 
features, or imperfections, to the international legal and normative provisions on 
humanitarian intervention influence intervention behavior, as it leaves vacuum in which other 
factors can take precedence over humanitarian considerations.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. Firstly, it brings 
together contemporary theory and recent cases. It is concluded from the review that most of 
the literature on humanitarian interventions can be categorized in two types. There is an 
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extensive body of literature that focuses on the legal and normative dimensions of 
humanitarian intervention on the one hand and there is an array of works evaluating 
humanitarian intervention successes on the other hand. What remains underexposed is the 
linkage between the research towards the theoretical and practical aspects of humanitarian 
interventions, given that the legal and normative aspect may poorly corresponds to the actual 
conduct of humanitarian interventions. Secondly, a recurring conspicuousness is identified 
within the second type of literature; the evaluation of intervention examples. The focus is 
disproportionately on interventions that were established as opposed to the adequate inclusion 
of interventions that failed to materialize for whatever reason. In this respect, the study of 
responses to humanitarian crises is incomplete. The advancement of academic knowledge on 
the factors that determine humanitarian intervention behavior depends on the inclusion of 
non-materialized interventions in the equation, as the one-sided nature of the current research 
focus paints an incomplete picture. This thesis addresses the gap by the conduct of a two-case 
comparison between an intervention that did materialize and one that did not.    
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
This section outlines the dependent variable and the independent variables that are derived 
from the literature review, and that will give shape to the remainder of this thesis.  
 
Dependent and independent variables 
The main subject under investigation, or dependent variable, is the difference in responses to 
humanitarian crises. The international community chose for a policy of intervention in one 
case and for non-intervention in the other, in spite of both cases representing situations of 
large scale human rights violations and human suffering. The research includes single states 
and alliances of states, with or without UNSC approval, as the parties that may determine the 
outcome variable.  
 As outlined in the review, three potential explanations are subject of investigation, 
with the possible conclusion that one, two or all three of those contribute to an inclusive 
answer to the central question of why there was an intervention in Libya but not in Syria. The 
first explanation is rooted in the characteristics of the international legal framework as 
providing an explanation. International law sets the framework for state behavior but lacks 
central authority and enforcement mechanisms (that characterize most national legal 
systems). The inclusion of this hypothesis may be surprising, given that Libya and Syria were 
subject to the same legal framework. However, the assumption is not that the legal 
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framework has caused the different responses; rather it is assumed that it has facilitated them. 
Providing an inclusive answer to the outcome variable is the main aim and thus the 
facilitating features of the legal system need addressing. Thus, the question of legality does 
not constitute a typical explanatory variable, and should not be viewed to operate on equal 
footing with the other explanations. Rather it illustrates the context in which the other 
explanations may impact intervention behavior.  
Main factors impacting intervention behavior are assumed to be interests and motives 
for an intervention; these at least partly determine if interventions are conducted by 
international community members or not. An analysis of broader political and economic 
interests at stake will deliver insight into the impact of interests on intervention.  
Expectations on a humanitarian intervention’s likelihood to improve a humanitarian 
situation, the anticipated intervention outcomes, are viewed to be a major factor impacting on 
intervention establishment. As resources are limited, a cost-benefit analysis is a logical 
expectation when assessing the feasibility of outcomes. The monetary cost issue is excluded, 
as decision-makers do not write up a specific budget prior to intervening. Instead, the focus is 
on broader factors that complicate conflict resolution. 
 
For the purpose of practical application to the cases, the explanatory variables are 
operationalized as follows: 
 
1. The ambiguity of humanitarian interventions under international law and the role of 
UNSC authorization 
International law may guide behavior but (in many respects) it fails to bind its subjects. The 
main assumption with respect to the impact of legality is that imperfections of the 
international legal system have facilitated the occurrence of different outcomes. The UNSC is 
charged with the task of authorizing humanitarian interventions while their general 
rightfulness is disputed. This leads to the impression that the permanent UNSC members may 
make use of the ambiguousness around humanitarian interventions, aligning their votes with 
the own agenda rather than humanitarian considerations. The scheme for further investigating 
the UNSC’s voting behavior looks as follows: 
 The impact of the UNSC’s role in authorizing, and thus legalizing, humanitarian 
interventions.  
- SC voting on Libya 
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- SC voting on Syria 
- How ‘Libya’ influenced SC ‘Syria’ 
 
2. Political and economic interests and motives 
The interests of the countries that are seen to most prominently mark international 
community actions, the permanent members of the UNSC, are identified, analyzed and 
discussed. These countries are referred to as ‘great powers’. As established in the literature 
review, self-interest is perceived to play a large role in the decision-making processes 
preceding humanitarian intervention plans. An analysis of interests at stake is thus an 
indispensable replenishment to the analysis of voting behavior.     
A qualitative interpretation of the findings provides insight into the role that political 
and economic interests may have played, in the decision-making processes that preceded the 
international community responses of intervention and nonintervention to crisis in Libya and 
Syria respectively. The results are presented according to the following scheme: 
 Political and economic interests at stake in the Libyan crisis 
- USA, France and the UK 
- Russia and China 
 Political and economic interests at stake in the Syrian crises. 
- USA, France and the UK 
- Russia and China 
 
3. Anticipated intervention outcomes 
Part of the decision-making process preceding policies of intervention or nonintervention is 
the careful estimation of the usefulness of that intervention. As such, perceived simplicity or 
difficulty to resolve a humanitarian crisis is likely to, and should, impact the decision-making 
processes. This issue is addressed by investigating three main factors that are deemed 
relevant for the feasibility of intervention objectives.  
 The military capacity of regimes is an important consideration for determining 
intervention objectives’ feasibility, as the ‘receiving’ regime is the military opponents that the 
intervening party encounters. The levels of domestic and international support for the regimes 
are assumed to complicate the establishment of an intervention. Domestic regime popularity 
may be an indicator for resistance against an intervention and international support for the 
regime is impacts intervention establishment as it can for example incur political costs on 
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interveners and problematize UNSC decision-making. Finally, the composition of society is 
an important factor for the long-term objectives of intervention. Highly fragmented societies 
with troublesome relations among the different groups may require a greater post-conflict 
commitment after an intervention has destabilizing society. The scheme looks as follows:  
 Libya 
- Military capacity of the current regime 
- Domestic and international support for the regime 
- The composition of society 
 Syria 
- Military capacity of the current regime 
- Domestic and international support for the regime 
- The composition of society 
 
The set of hypotheses designed on the basis of the variables looks as follows: 
H1 The disputed status of humanitarian interventions under international law and the 
UNSC’s role in authorizing interventions cause a poor correspondence between 
intervention legality and humanitarian necessity. 
 
H2 The great powers’ political and economic interests at stake caused the occurrence of 
an intervention in Libya but not in Syria.  
 
H3  Expectations regarding the necessary commitment for resolving the Syria crisis 
prevented an intervention for ending the conflict, as seen in Libya.  
 
It should be noted that the hypotheses are not strict alternatives to one another; rather they are 
potential components of an inclusive answer to the question of different international 
responses. The use of ‘inclusive explanation’ here refers to the multi-facetted character of the 
explanation, rather than to an (impossible) aim of unveiling all factors of relevance in the 
literal sense.   
It is possible that one, two or all three of the hypotheses are confirmed. Alternatively 
it can be the case that none of the hypotheses have significant explanatory value. The fact that 
the hypotheses are components rather than alternatives stems from decisions made in the 
design of this study, rooted in the ambition to provide an inclusive answer.  
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 If one or more hypotheses are confirmed, subsequent research needs to be conducted 
on the basis of those hypotheses. If none hold, additional hypotheses need to be formed or the 
case selection needs to be reviewed. Finally, given the qualitative nature of this research and 
the general character of the hypotheses, the hypotheses may be proven partially true if they 
explain some phenomena but not all. In this case the formation of additional, more specific, 
hypotheses offers a solution.  
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3. Research design 
Case selection 
The cases of Libya and Syria are chosen on the basis of a number of considerations. This 
section introduces the cases as well as their specific characteristics that make them suitable 
subjects of analysis in the comparison at hand.  
 
Libya 
After 42 years of tyranny and oppression, the Libyan Revolution was one that was long in the 
making when the uprisings started in Benghazi on February 15, 2011.
53
 The international 
community was baffled by the exorbitant use of violence as Gaddafi’s security forces used 
their weapons indiscriminately and fired at the protesting crowds. The rebel forces formed the 
National Transitional Council, or NTC, and challenged the Gaddafi regime as the 
representative body of the Libyan people. The UN recognized the NTC as the rightful 
representation of Libyans on September 16.
54
  
 Earlier that year, in March, the continued violence by the regime forces caused the 
UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973 for the establishment of a no-fly zone and the 
protection of the Libyan people against Gaddafi’s forces ‘by means of all necessary 
measures.’55 The Gaddafi regime was overthrown and Muammar was captured and killed by 
Libyans, after NATO jets had fired at former leader’s convoy.  
 
Many scholars have discussed the factors responsible for the course of events in Libya. 
Gaddafi’s isolated position and attitude with respect to his people is explained to have caused 
his popularity to wane early in the conflict, thereby enabling the uprisings to spread swiftly 
over the country. For example, Libya is generally seen to have great potential because of its 
oil resources, but high levels of nepotism and corruption under Gaddafi’s rule prevented 
ordinary Libyans from benefitting.
56
 In addition, Gaddafi left a range of minorities within 
Libya’s society deeply dissatisfied as the regime actively discriminated against different 
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groups, subjecting people arbitrarily to arrests and conducting political terrorism against 
exiles abroad.
57
  
 It is a common observation that a robust patronage system is an important pillar on 
which authoritarian regimes rely.
 58
 Gaddafi’s system proved to have been rather brittle, given 
the rapidity with which his regime crumbled. High-level professionals such as lawyers, 
businessmen and politicians joined the rebels in an early stage of the revolt and they were 
exactly the people Gaddafi should have kept close.
59
  
During his more than four-decade rule, Muammar Gaddafi developed a tradition of 
keeping his military forces weak, as he feared military coups to be organized. The weakness 
of the military caused it to split up soon after the outbreak of violence. One part joined the 
revolutionaries and thus the rebels, later the NTC, enjoyed a significant influx of military 
professionals, while Gaddafi was forced to hire external militias from the countries located 
south of Libya.
60
  
 
Syria 
The uprisings in Syria started in March 2011 and initially protested against the high levels of 
corruption and human rights abuses in the country.
61
 The civil conflict became a civil war 
after many had defected from the regime forces and joined the Free Syrian Army, which was 
an amalgamation of different rebelling groups. The international community witnessed a 
humanitarian catastrophe that left 6.5 million people displaced at the end of 2013 of whom 
many fled to neighboring countries. Life in the overcrowded refugee camps in Lebanon, 
Jordan, Turkey and Egypt is said to be not much better than in Syria itself.
62
 
The Syrian society is highly fragmented, yet the al-Assad regime is perceived 
relatively strongly anchored within it. Many people support the regime for its stabilizing 
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capacity.
63
 The al-Assad family belongs to the Alawite minority and Assad is by many seen 
as a protector of the different minorities in the country. The fact that roughly 75 percent of 
the population belongs to the Sunni Muslim majority is deemed to give al-Assad a baseline of 
support among the minorities. Minorities fear that a revolution will lead to the Sunni Muslim 
Majority taking over control, thereby inaugurating the end of the secular state and relative 
protection of (non-Muslim) minorities.
64
  
The al-Assad regime has convinced many Syrians that ‘foreign evil’ is to blame for 
the current state of Syria. External forces are accused of organizing and manipulating the 
rebels and are thus held responsible for the unrest, rather than a range of deeply rooted 
societal wrongs. Syria’s elite, e.g. businessmen and military officials, has remained relatively 
loyal to the Assad-rule. On the global political level the Syrian regime finds itself backed by 
Russia and China, whose support prevents strong UN action from materializing. International 
sanctions failed to end the violence as Russia and also Iran continued to provide material 
support to the regime.
65
 
 
A remarkable chapter in the Syria crisis is the chemical weapons issue. More than two years 
after the outbreak of violence President Obama of the US addressed circulating rumors on the 
use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. He said: “That is a red line for us and there 
would be enormous consequences if we would be seeing movement on the chemical weapons 
or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculus significantly.”66 Many 
interpreted this statement as a signal for action, based on the belief that it was a matter of 
time before evidence on chemical weapons use would surface. The UK, France, the US itself 
and finally the relevant UN commission, all concluded that chemical weapons were used. 
However, Russian diplomatic interference prevented the US from having to act upon what 
was by many interpreted as a promise for intervention. The Russians negotiated a deal and 
offered the Syrian regime to comply with the destruction of its chemical weapons. More 
disastrous international action was thereby averted.
67
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Commonalities and differences 
The two cases have in common the wider Arab Spring context and they experienced similar 
scenarios of escalating regime violence against the rebels and population, leading to all-out 
civil wars. A major difference concerning the two leaderships is the language they used. 
Gaddafi promised to destroy every single one of his opponents, while al-Assad has not 
expressed such strong language. Another example is the fundamentally different position the 
leaders had in domestic and international politics and society. Concerning the dynamics of 
the conflict it should be noted that the Syrian society is much more fragmented in 
composition than the Libyan society, and that external stakeholders have different interests in 
the Middle East and Northern Africa. Finally, a very important note to be made is that the 
handling of the Libyan conflict is by many observed to have affected the handling of the 
Syrian conflict.  
 
Data collection and methods 
The theoretical foundation of this thesis is provided by the existing literature on humanitarian 
interventions. The availability of literature is unproblematic as humanitarian interventions 
have been at the center of scholarly discussion. The quality of the case studies depends on the 
obtainments of reliable information on the crises of Libya and Syria. The Arab Spring may be 
a recent phenomenon but scholars have fundamentally enriched the academic account of the 
matter. In addition to academic articles, among the sources used are government reports, 
produced by different governments and publications by different organizations such as the 
UN, NGO’s and human rights institutions. PhD and master’s theses are used as students 
developed an early interest in the Arab Spring and have contributed significantly to the 
available information. Finally, articles by major news sources, such as BBC and CNN, are 
limitedly used, as well as blogs written by international relations specialists.  
 The gathered information is presented according to the operationalized independent 
variables and the hypotheses. The findings are discussed in a separate section at the end of 
each chapter.  
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4. The disputed legality of humanitarian interventions and the role of the 
UNSC 
As discussed in the literature review the sources of international law contain diverging 
provisions on humanitarian interventions and thus their status remains ambiguous. The fact 
that the permanent members of the UNSC, the US, France, the UK, Russia and China, are 
charged with the task to determine intervention legality by means of authorization does not 
resolve the ambiguousness.  
An analysis of the general legal framework concerning interventions is expected to 
deliver few interesting results; the two cases occurred during the same time period and were 
thus subject to the same legal framework. A focus on the UNSC’s voting allows for 
interesting conclusions on the legality of interventions; the interpretation of the framework 
rather than the framework itself becomes the central issue. In addition, the research provides 
insight into how the Libyan case may have affected Syria.  
This section analyzes the voting behavior of each of the permanent UNSC members. 
The intervention in Libya was authorized by the SC and was thus legal, while a proposal for a 
similar intervention in Syria was not submitted to the SC, and thus, a hypothetical 
intervention in Syria remains illegal (unless it is an act of (collective) self-defense, as 
provided by article 51 of the UN Charter). The relevant hypothesis reads: The disputed status 
of humanitarian interventions under international law and the UNSC’s role in authorizing 
interventions cause a poor correspondence between intervention legality and humanitarian 
necessity. 
 
UN Security Council voting on Libya 
On February 26, 2011, the Council adopted SC Resolution 1970. The resolution’s main 
provision was the condemnation of violence and human rights breaches by the Libyan 
regime. It referred the case to the International Criminal Court, imposed sanctions such as 
travel bans upon key figures related to the Libyan regime and froze their assets. The US, 
France, the UK and Germany proposed the resolution. Russia demanded the inclusion of a 
provision to secure that Resolution 1970 could not be used to justify an intervention in Libya. 
Defected Libyan diplomats promoted the inclusion of a provision for establishing a no-fly 
zone. In spite of their efforts, the final resolution remained peaceful in nature.
68
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The adoption of Resolution 1973 followed upon Gaddafi’s failure to comply with 
Resolution 1970. It authorized the intervention in Libya and was deemed necessary on the 
basis of some strong words by Gaddafi, as he had “expressed clear intent to continue 
committing massive human rights violations.”69 The international community’s interpretation 
of this statement led to the conclusion that many lives were at risk. Russia and China 
abstained from voting on the resolution and thereby facilitated its adoption without explicitly 
consenting to an intervention.
70
 The resolution demanded the immediate establishment of a 
cease-fire and an end to the violence, imposed a no-fly zone, authorized the use of force with 
an ‘all necessary measures’ mandate, except for foreign occupation.71 Gaddafi’s initial 
response to the resolution indicated willingness to comply with the call for a cease-fire and a 
direct end to the violence. However, the explicit threats addressing the Libyan opposition in 
one of his speeches shortly after unveiled that his intentions were otherwise.   
 
Paul Williams and Colleen Popke argue that UNSC Resolution 1973 provides a blueprint for 
humanitarian action; it was characterized by swift UNSC authorization and constituted a 
well-drafted resolution providing the necessary mandate for aggressive and immediate 
implementation.
72
 In other words, Resolution 1973 is explained to have been a model 
framework for humanitarian action. 
Prior to the intervention, Russia was suspicious of the interpretation that Western 
states would give to the resolution, and expressed its concern about the perceived inadequate 
demarcation of the appropriate rules of engagement. The Russians feared that the West was 
given a free hand in handling the Libya crisis and foresaw that a much greater intervention 
would occur than deemed necessary for the halting of violence.
73
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UN Security Council voting on Syria 
The Security Council’s attempts to take a position in the Syrian crisis started off with two 
proposals that were blocked by Russia and China in October 2011 and February 2012. The 
rejected proposals contained that the Syrian state had a responsibly to protect its people and 
condemned the use of violence and the continuous breaches of human rights by the regime.
74
  
 The following Resolution 2042 was adopted in April 2012 and authorized the 
dispatching of an unarmed military mission to Syria for a period of 90 days. Subsequent 
Resolution 2043 was adopted only a week after and attempted to arrange the implementation 
of a peace plan for Syria.
75
 The plan was developed by the Arab League in cooperation with 
the UN and included the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The initial Syrian response 
to the plan was promising but within several weeks it became clear that the al-Assad regime 
had failed to keep the peace as the observed level of violence was on the rise again. This was 
also to be attributed to the continuation of ‘defensive action’ by the Free Syrian Army, which 
as an organization of defected military, against the al-Assad troops.
76
 Due to the relapse into 
violence, the peacekeeping mission was cancelled in June 2012. Resolution 2059 extended 
the military observation mission that resulted from Resolution 2042 with another 30 days.
77
  
On 19 July 2012, another proposal was submitted, attempting to attach consequences 
to the Syrian failure to comply with the peace plan, by means of imposing economic 
sanctions. This proposal was vetoed by Russia and China.
78
  
 After a relatively long period of Security Council inaction concerning the matter, 
Resolution 2118 was adopted in September 2013. The Syrian conflict’s character had 
changed and received renewed attention. In response to the UN’s affirmation that chemical 
weapons were used in Syria, the resolution deemed the possession of such weapons a threat 
to international peace and security and compelled the destruction of the arsenal. As seen in 
previous resolutions, also this document emphasized the territorial integrity of Syria. Finally, 
it advocated the formation of a transitional government, which should include members of the 
current government, the rebel organization and other groups.
79
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None of the resolutions adopted on the case of Syria contains provisions of similar strength as 
those addressing the case of Libya. Not only was an intervention explicitly excluded but also 
a condemnation of both regime violence and rebel violence was not part of any resolution 
that succeeded in the SC. As such, the resolutions failed to ascribe accountability to any of 
the warring parties.  
 
How ‘Libya’ influenced ‘Syria’ 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suspected that NATO would do more than stipulated 
in Resolution 1973. He later on stated that the decision to not veto the resolution was a 
mistake as it authorized the West to do whatever it wanted against a sovereign state. The 
NATO intervention in Libya was anticipated to be interpreted as allowing for regime change, 
which was certainly not intended in the eyes of Russia and China.
80
  
 The regret about the ‘silent approval’ for Resolution 1973 thus surfaced before the 
intervention took place. The expectations for a ‘mission creep’, a term for the perceived 
exceeding of the NATO mandate, were deemed correct after the intervention started. This 
was deemed to have severe consequences for humanitarian intervention in the future. Roland 
Dannreuther asserts “It is this broader context of a resolute opposition to Western military 
intervention to support opposition forces to existing regimes which provides an explanation 
for why, after Libya, the Russian stance towards Syria was so uncompromising.”81 The 
events in Libya and the dissatisfaction about them are explained to shape the international 
community’s limited capacity to respond to internal conflicts in the future.82 
 
Findings: the ambiguous impact of the UNSC’s role 
The intervention in Libya was officially legal as it was preceded by SC authorization. No 
proposals were submitted to the Council attempting to formulate a resolution of similar 
thoroughness for ending the violence in Syria and, for that reason, an intervention on Syrian 
territory would be deemed illegal in strict terms.  
The proposals that were blocked by Russia and China have caused a gap between the 
rejected proposal of July 19, 2012 and the adopted Resolution 2118 on the chemical weapons 
issue more than a year later. The members of the SC presumably realized that a deadlock was 
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reached and that little could be done for the faith of the Syrians at that point. The chemical 
weapons issue apparently changed the dynamics as ‘a threat to international peace and 
security’ was mentioned. Some may have seen such an inclusion as a pretext for intervention 
under the heading of self-defense.  
Russia and China abstained from voting on Resolution 1973, and thereby (silently) 
allowed for the intervention. Proposals addressing the situation in Syria, condemning the 
violence in the country and ascribing responsibility to the Syrian regime were time after time 
rejected by Russia and China. This may explain why no proposal was submitted to the SC in 
which an intervention was called for. Russia and China are likely to have blocked 
condemnations, as they were perceived to be a pretext for intervention. The SC thus already 
‘stranded’ one step before interventions even came into question, namely in ascribing 
responsibility. 
 
At this point in research, it is found that the decisions made by the Security Council do not 
logically correspond to the humanitarian necessity for an intervention; two atrocities 
encounter different responses. Resolution 1970 addressing Libya ascribed clear obligations 
under R2P to the regime and, upon the regime’s failure to comply, an intervention was 
facilitated by the adoption of Resolution 1973. The relative plentitude of resolutions 
addressing the Syria case led to a deadlock, only to be overcome after the situation worsened 
as chemical weapons were used. A resolution seemed Russia’s best strategy to prevent an 
intervention in Syria. Finally, it was found that the Russian and Chinese unwillingness with 
respect to the Syrian crisis might be seen as a direct consequence of the perceived mission 
creep in Libya.    
It is concluded that the hypotheses is confirmed, as the ambiguity of the status of 
interventions gives the UNSC members extensive possibilities to include non-humanitarian 
considerations in their decision-making. 
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5. The role of political and economic interests and motives 
As outlined in the literature review, the puzzle of the true intentions and motives for 
humanitarian interventions remains subject to scholarly disagreement. The production of 
claims on stakeholder’s true motives for either intervening or refraining from doing so is 
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. The main aim here is to identify the interests that 
are deemed to have shaped motivations for the intervention behavior of the great powers, 
which are the US, France, the UK, Russia and China. These countries are assumed to have 
the greatest impact on whether or not humanitarian interventions are organized as they hold 
veto power in the UNSC.  
The findings are put into the context of the role that the states play in international 
society, in order to provide insight into how their actions were influenced. The relevant 
hypothesis reads: The great powers’ political and economic interests at stake caused the 
occurrence of an intervention in Libya but not in Syria. 
 
‘Great power’ interests at stake in the Libya conflict 
The US, France and the UK 
Just prior to the intervention in Libya, the US communicated to have modest intentions and 
emphasized its intended involvement to be limited in scope and time. Only ten days after 
initial US engagement in the establishment of the no-fly zone, the attacking forces were 
replaced for a low-profile background role.
83
  
Relations between the US and Libya were described as ‘a cold understanding’, which 
logically reflected upon the political and economic ties between the countries. Gaddafi’s 
actions, such as the established support for terrorism
84
 and the nationalization of American oil 
companies in the 1970s, negatively impacted the relations.
85
 Prior to the Libya crisis, the US 
purchased only around seven percent of Libya’s crude oil, while Germany and Italy received 
together as much as 57 percent of Libyan production.
86
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The US’s broader political interests are deemed numerous and diverse. Firstly, 
political scientists equated the Libya crisis with a major window of opportunity for the US, 
potentially enabling it to gain influence in Northern Africa while improving damaged 
relations with some Arab countries. The French traditionally dominate the region and over 
the years economic relations with China intensified.
87
 As the intervention in Libya was 
preceded by an Arab League call for action, many deem that US’s role in the intervention 
constitutes at least partly a US attempt to ingratiate itself with the Arab world.
88
 A more 
explicitly communicated US objective was the strengthening of relations with European 
allies; US involvement was also a payback strategy for the European support during the 
Afghanistan war.
89
 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the European loyalty 
stating: “They have been there, and a lot of them have been there despite the fact that they 
were not attacked. The attack came on us… They stuck with us… When it comes to Libya, 
we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies… This was in their 
vital national interest…"90 Clinton concluded her speech by remarking that vital interests of 
close allies are vital interests of the US itself.  
The perceived role of human rights deserves mentioning as some observed that the US 
engagement in Libya was ‘largely driven by domestic human rights groups’. Also the US 
itself frequently argued to have ‘a moral duty to protect’ under R2P.91 In spite of the often-
perceived dichotomy between self-interests and humanitarian motives as the underlying 
foundation for humanitarian interventions, they are more compatible than one would expect. 
The US, arguably more than any other state, commits to the promotion of liberal values and 
human rights. Advocates of hegemonic stability theory may argue that the active upholding 
of the principles on which the hegemony is founded, serves the self-interests of the hegemon 
as it preserves the credibility of the system it created and strives to maintain.
92
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The linkages between France and Libya are short in both geographical and historical terms, 
which resulted in relatively strong economic ties between the countries. For example, France 
imported roughly 10 percent of its entire oil consumption from Libya.
93
  
France was one of two countries to take the lead in the international action against the 
Qaddafi regime. The French were perceived to be the most vocal supporters of EU and UN 
sanctions against the regime, as well as the most assertive proponents for Security Council 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973.
94
 In addition, France was the first country to recognize the rebel 
organization that challenged the Libyan regime’s legitimacy, the Transitional National 
Council, as the rightful representation of the Libyan people. The country dropped the first 
bombs on Libyan territory while an emergency meeting, attended by the Secretary Generals 
of the UN and the Arab League and the EU’s High Representative, was still going on in 
Paris.
95
   
The French were frequently accused of having responded rather hastily to the Libyan 
crisis, thereby causing poor coordination within the Anglo-Franco alliance and frustrating the 
European Council, as the French attitude prevented the much-desired unified European 
position.
96
 Many observed the French response to have been shaped by a clear top-down 
political process; a major role is attributed to President Sarkozy himself. An explanation for 
Sarkozy’s determination to react swiftly to the crisis, thereby causing poor coordination and 
dissatisfaction among other stakeholders, is found in domestic politics. Prior to the Libyan 
crisis, the President suffered from decreasing popularity and elections were coming up. In 
France there was strong support, both within politics and society, for a mission to save the 
Libyans and thus many deemed that Sarkozy identified an opportunity for a popularity 
boost.
97
  
 
The British took, together with France, the lead in the Libyan intervention but their actions 
are generally perceived as having been more cautious than those of the French. The UK took 
considerably more time to assemble with key parties for gathering intelligence. As a result 
British Prime Minster David Cameron “repeatedly found himself diplomatically one step 
                                                          
93
 Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage For the Military Intervention in 
Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO,” 23. 
94
 Ibid. 13 
95
 Ibid. 17 
96
 Ibid.  
97
 “Libya: Beyond Regime Change,” Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, 2011, 1, 
http://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/libya_beyond_regime_change.web.pdf. 
30 
 
behind the French President.”98 For example, the NTC recognition by the British was 
announced more than four months later than the French recognition. Prior to intervening, the 
UK constructed a set of requirements on demonstrable need, legal basis and regional support 
for intervening. Only upon the fulfillment of all these requirements the British took action.
99
   
 The British economic interests in relation to Libya were rather limited; the UK’s oil 
import from the country was much smaller than that of other major European countries such 
as France, Italy and Germany. However, the NTC seems to have understood the importance 
of UK support for intervention as it promised the British lucrative oil contracts in return for 
its support.  
 Similar to the decision-making in France, the British lead in international community 
action in Libya is popularly attributed to the efforts of one political figure; David Cameron. A 
similar explanation rooted in domestic politics is lacking, as no elections were scheduled 
before 2015. International politics arguably provides a more adequate explanation; it was 
observed that the British responded to the US call for a European power to take the lead to 
secure their Atlantic ties.
100
   
 
Russia and China 
Roland Dannreuther asserts that in Russia, the view of the Arab Spring uprisings as 
movements for democratization is rejected; rather a process of strengthening and 
consolidating extremism was identified. As such, the Arab Spring was perceived to 
potentially undermine regional stability, thereby constituting a major threat to Russian 
national security interests.
101
 
The initial Russian response to the events in Libya is deemed hesitant and incoherent. 
Analyzing the Russian interests at stake in the Libyan crisis suggests that both political and 
economic interests are present. Russia had significant commercial interests in Libya, ranging 
from oil-and-gas contracts to railway construction.
102
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Some link the perceived incoherent Russian response to the Syria crisis to a growing 
disharmony among the Russian political elite. In March 2011 Konstantin Kosachev, the head 
of the Russian Parliament’s International Affairs Committee, explicitly addressed that a 
responsibility to protect comes with statehood, and is thus a precondition for Libyan 
sovereignty. In addition he mentioned to be supportive of the rebel forces. Vladimir Putin, 
Prime Minster at the time, “compared the military operation against Gaddafi to a colonial 
military invasion”.103 Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russia at the time, expressed in May 
2011 that he “not only shared the Western policy view toward Libya but publicly indicated 
that Gaddafi has de-legitimized himself by brutally oppressing his own people”.104  
The later controversy on the alleged ‘mission creep’ by the Western powers, having 
served the objective of regime change rather than the protection of the Libyans, “was a 
significant embarrassment for Medvedev and Russian elite support and public popularity 
shifted towards Putin.”105  
Some scholars concluded that although Russia was in principle against an 
intervention, its objections were minor as the interests at play were relatively unimportant. 
Some explain the Russian abstinence concerning Resolution 1973 as a Russian reconciliation 
effort with the West. ‘Giving the US its way’ allegedly served the ‘reset’ agenda for 
developing a more cooperative understanding with major Western institutions such as NATO 
and the EU.
106
 “In other words, the Libyan debates were not about Libya but about Russia 
and its (re) positioning vis-à-vis the West.”107 
 
Chinese economic interests in Libya may seem extensive in absolute terms but do not 
convince when compared to Chinese interests elsewhere. Roughly 30.000 Chinese worked in 
Libya prior to the uprisings and virtually all of these were evacuated to China.
108
  
The Chinese abstinence from voting on Resolution 1973 is explained by Michael 
Swaine to serve Chinese interests in a broader sense. The country significantly invested in the 
Middle East and on the African continent and thus being at odds with the Arab League and 
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African Union, the two primary regional organizations that were supportive of an 
intervention in Libya, could damage ties with numerous countries.
109
 
 
‘Great power’ interests at stake in the Syria conflict 
The US, France and the UK 
The relations between the US and Syria have known ups and downs but generally speaking 
the negative issues overshadow the positives ones. Syria was put on the US’s list of countries 
supporting terrorism in 1979 and was never removed from that list. Still, relations between 
the countries somewhat normalized during the 1990s when Syria became part of the anti-Iraq 
coalition during the Gulf War. The improved relations deteriorated again during the last 
decade due to various issues, such as Syria’s close relationship with a prime antagonist of the 
US, namely Iran, and the Syrian support for Hamas in the Palestinian territories and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. These organizations are listed as terrorist organizations by the US.
110
  
The economic relations between the US and Syria are non-essential for either side. 
This is mostly the result of ongoing economic US sanctions against Syria. In 2010, the total 
volume of mutual trade equated less than a billion USD.
111
  
A main US stake in the Syrian conflict concerns the security of Israel, which is 
traditionally a close US ally. Decreased regional stability, especially the emergence of 
ungoverned or poorly governed lands, has implications for the Israeli. “These areas host or 
could attract terrorists, weapons traffickers, criminal networks, refugees, and migrants, and 
thus contribute to trends that appear to threaten Israeli security.”112 Some indicated that Israel 
has little interest in regime change in Syria, as a replacing regime might be of a more 
aggressive nature with respect to Israel’s presence in the region.113  
 
The French have provided humanitarian, economic and diplomatic support to the Syrian 
rebels from the beginning of the crisis in 2011. French politicians have attempted to unblock 
the dead-end for action in Syria that paralyzes the UNSC. This French stance with respect to 
an intervention in Syria has known different phases; initially France opposed intervention 
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unless a UN mandate was received.
114
 Later, after the chemical weapons issue arose, France 
expressed willingness to take part in an intervention if the US were to undertake such 
action.
115
  
France is observed to maintain closer relations with the Arab states and its former 
colonies than other major Western powers.
116
 Also France and Syria have generally been on 
good terms since the signing of the Franco Syrian Treaty of Independence in 1936. On a 
personal level the different French presidents generally went along well with the al-Assad 
family. However, some major political issues deteriorated the good relations over the last 
decades. Among these are the French disapproval of Syrian hostilities towards Lebanon and 
the French attempts to become closer to the US.
117
 Several attempts to improve the Franco-
Syrian understanding were undertaken, of which some were successful, such as the Syrian 
attempt to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.
118
 In spite of the improvement, the economic 
interests of France in Syria prior to the outbreak of violence were relatively small; the 2007 
market share of French products in Syria constituted 1.8 percent of the total Syrian import.
119
  
“Paris has continued to pursue a wide range of diplomatic, cultural, economic and 
other interests with states of the Arab world, despite periodic difficulties, in search of an 
overarching objective of influence and status on the international stage.”120 The French 
political interests in Syria are summarized as a search for prestige, rather than clearly defined 
set of interests that drive French involvement.
121
  
 
Direct British interests at stake in the Syria crisis are difficult to identify, as relations between 
the countries were minimal. However, the British have taken the lead, together with France, 
in putting pressure on the al-Assad regime. The UK assertively advocated the lifting of the 
EU arms embargo to Syria, as this was necessary for supplying the rebels. British supplies 
were reported to be non-lethal equipment, humanitarian assistance and training.
122
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With the 2013 chemical weapons issue, the diverging positions of David Cameron 
and the British House of Commons became painfully clear; Cameron strongly advocated 
British involvement if an intervention was conducted by e.g. the US. However, the 
Parliament rejected any scenario of British partaking. Polls have indicated that three-quarters 
of the British population deem the Parliament’s decision correct.123 The Parliament’s decision 
was described as being a humiliation for Cameron and a blot on UK-US relations. Especially 
the Atlantic ties are generally seen to shape the British foreign policy and the Parliament’s 
decision is deemed to have long-term consequences for those ties.
124
 Avoiding that the UK 
‘blindly’ followed the US into war is said to be a prime motivation for the Parliament’s 
decision. Some have related this motivation to the events that led up to the British fighting in 
Iraq in 2003. British Labour leader Ed Milliband criticized Cameron’s pro-intervention 
position, stating that Britain “doesn't need reckless and impulsive leadership, it needs calm 
and measured leadership."
125
  
 
Russia and China 
Russia and China put great emphasis on the United Nations as the world’s prime governing 
body. The countries have issued joint statements in the past in which they explicitly commit 
to the further strengthening of the UN. Some defined the Russian and Chinese position of 
countering Western interventionism, as an act of balancing US hegemony and an attempt to 
strengthen the multipolar trend.
126
 As such, they block the US’s value spreading by use of 
their veto. “That shared fundamental objective underpins their foreign policy in general and 
keeps them pointing in the same general direction.”127  
Russia is among the Syrian regime’s main allies; the two countries have bonded over their 
shared aversion of Western international politics. “The principal instruments that Russia 
utilized in pursuit of its objectives in Syria were primarily diplomatic rather than military or 
                                                          
123
 Brett Logiurato, ”Britain Doesn’t Care if Syria Affects Their Special Relationship With the US,” 
Business Insider, September 2, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/britain-syria-vote-special-relationship-us-
poll-obama-cameron-2013-9?IR=T#ixzz3Q9T1H8mD.  
124
 Tom Rogan, ”Why the British Parliament Vetoed Intervnetion in Syria,” Tom Rogan Thinks (blog), 
August 29, 2013, http://www.tomroganthinks.com/2013/08/why-british-parliament-vetoed.html. 
125
 “Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Vote on Syria Action,” BBC News UK Politics, August 30, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783.  
126
 Peter Ferdinand, “The Positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of 
Recent Crises,” Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013, 10, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433800/EXPO-
SEDE_NT%282013%29433800_EN.pdf. 
127
 Ibid. 
35 
 
economic in nature.”128 Russia has backed the Syrian regime throughout the crisis and 
blocked various Security Council Resolutions on the matter.  
Russian policy makers are said to believe in only two possible scenarios for the future 
of Syria. Either al-Assad reaffirms control over the country and stability returns, or the 
regime falls and Syria falls prey to radical Islamism. The latter scenario constitutes a threat to 
Russian national security, due to “the potential spillover from Syria to the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, and to Russia itself…”129 
Westerners have frequently accused Russia of giving precedence to economic benefits 
by the perceived reprehensible continuation of weapon deliveries to the country. The Syrian 
hunger for armament has proven fruitful; the net worth of current weaponry contracts is 
estimated to be worth 1.5 billion USD, which is 10 percent of total Russian arms exports.
130
 
The analysis of Russian economic interests at stake becomes more difficult when including 
its broader economic interests. The strongest and most significant relations between Russia 
and the region are with countries critical towards the Syrian regime and supportive of 
intervening. Notably Turkey imports 63 percent of its natural gas from Russia and the value 
of trade between the countries reached 34 billion USD in 2012. Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan has turned to Russia and warned that the country will not be forgiven for assisting 
the Syrian regime.
131
 
 
Chinese direct interests in the Syrian conflict are much less significant than the Russian ones. 
Thus, a first explanation for the Chinese opposition to the Western position on Syria is found 
in tradition, or ideology. The assertive Western promotion of human rights and liberal values 
collide with the Chinese Communist Party’s tradition of nonintervention. China seems to 
identify in the UN a vehicle for contrasting those Western policies and thus the Chinese vetos 
in the Syria case may be seen as a balancing act against Western dominance.
132
 Another 
explanation for the Chinese tradition of nonintervention is that it is at least partially rooted in 
the own domestic struggles with ethnic minorities and separatist movements. The handling of 
these issues in China is in the West perceived to be rather hard-handed. Chinese support for 
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the Western promotion of human rights around the globe would be illogical given that 
Western voices are critical of the Chinese domestic human rights record as well.
133
   
Findings: dealing with a ‘foolish’ Gaddafi and a sly al-Assad 
The identification of US interests at stake delivers some interesting insights. It was found that 
especially its geopolitical interests are reconcilable with the country’s response to the crisis. 
Prominent examples are the ‘window of opportunity’ to gain influence in Northern Africa 
and repair relations with Arab League members that were supportive of an intervention. The 
perception of US involvement as reward for European loyalty indicates that the US sought to 
further strengthen good relations with the European powers. Finally, the US’s human rights 
agenda was promoted, as in line with its liberal ideology and the global system it seeks to 
maintain. The French assertiveness in responding to the crisis was linked to its historical ties 
to the region. The method of engagement, hasty and uncoordinated action, is best explained 
to have been the result of domestic politics, domestic public opinion, and a much needed 
popularity boost for President Sarkozy. The British more thoughtful response could not be 
traced back to existing economic interests but potentially to future benefits, and also to the 
greater political objective of maintaining good Atlantic relations.  
 The Russian hesitance for intervening was partly rooted in a fundamentally different 
interpretation of the Arab Spring events and the thereto-connected different interpretation of 
the implications for Russian security. The formulation of the country’s response was plagued 
by ‘a growing disharmony within Russian politics’. The Russian decision to abstain from 
voting on UNSC Resolution 1973, thereby facilitating the intervention, is explained as 
serving the improvement of the poor relations to the West; sacrificing the isolated and 
unpopular Gaddafi regime to the Western interventionists was a small price for an improved 
understanding between Russia and the West.   
Chinese economic interests in Libya were extensive but not in comparison to its 
interests with other countries in the region that supported the intervention. As such, allowing 
for an intervention served the greater Chinese economic interests best, it is thus found that 
China’s economic considerations took precedence over its ideological aversion against 
intervention.  
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Analyzing the interests at stake in the Syria crisis delivers a different overview as the Middle 
East is of much more importance to the great powers for a variety of reasons. The US 
relations with Syria have been troublesome for a long time. Stability is what the US needs in 
the region for its close ally Israel, and the US seem to lack a specific strategy. One clear issue 
is that the US does not see the removal of al-Assad as the key to Israel’s safely as both 
lawlessness and a successor regime in Syria may decrease the Israeli security position. 
Historical ties shaped the French position in Syria, an ambition for regional influence and 
global positioning. In other words, the French response to Syria may serve to bring the 
country close to the position it desires to fulfill within the international community. The 
British took a leading role in pressurizing the Syrian regime. The chemical weapons issue 
brought trouble to the UK as it caused the unwillingness of politicians and British society to 
‘blindly’ follow the US (again) to surface. It turns out that British engagement was largely 
driven by the personal efforts of Prime Minster David Cameron.  
 
Russia has chosen a strategy for dealing with the Syria conflict that comes at a high cost, as it 
cannot be reconciled with the greater political and economic interests of the country. Indeed, 
Russia and Syria are political and economic allies, but the relations sacrificed by Russia’s 
uncompromising position, e.g. with Turkey, are much more substantive than those with Syria. 
Looking at the issue of security, a rather convincing argument for Russian support to al-
Assad is the Russian naval base on Syrian ground, providing Russia with access to the 
Mediterranean. However, the near unconditional Russian support for al-Assad may cause the 
loss of that naval base if regime change eventually happens. Other than the naval issue, the 
motivations of Russia seem to have been rooted in ideological factors; it rejects Western 
interventionism, especially after the experiences in Libya. China is seen to largely follow the 
Russian lead, although with less noise, in countering the West. This response most likely 
served the Chinese agenda of tradition and ideology. By respecting Syria’s state sovereignty 
China provides an alternative to Western interventionism within the UN framework.     
Ideological factors have influenced the responses of all great powers. As a state’s 
politics are assumed to serve its ideology, ideology is seen as a political interest. The 
conclusion is drawn that the hypotheses assuming a role for political and economic interests 
in intervention behavior is confirmed, as policies of choice served especially the broader 
political agendas of UNSC members.  
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6. The role of anticipated intervention outcomes 
The hypothesis used for investigating the role of anticipated intervention outcomes rests on 
the simple assumption that a humanitarian intervention should not be conducted if it is 
deemed unlikely to improve the humanitarian situation that it addresses. The crises in Libya 
and Syria result from deliberate human rights breaches by regimes. An investigation of the 
military capacity of those regimes is a first step in establishing the feasibility of intervention 
objectives. Domestic and international support for the regimes is among the factors that 
complicate humanitarian interventions; domestic popularity may cause resistance and 
international regime support problematizes the establishment of an intervention in the first 
place. Finally, the composition of society, and the thereto-linked post-intervention 
commitment, is deemed an important factor for shaping intervention policies. The hypothesis 
for testing the role of anticipated outcomes on intervention behavior reads: Expectations 
regarding the necessary commitment for resolving the Syria crisis prevented an intervention 
for ending the conflict, as seen in Libya.  
 
Libya: military capacity, regime support and the composition of society 
Qaddafi had long been aware that the Libyan military could one day turn against him; a faith 
not uncommon for authoritarian regimes as was illustrated by the demise of the Egyptian and 
Tunisian regimes earlier in the Arab Spring. For this reason Gaddafi kept his army weak.
134
 
Moreover, the decades of sanctions and embargos added to the military weakness as the 
purchase of military equipment was troublesome. An additional effect of the slow and limited 
modernization capability of Libya’s army is that the international community was well 
informed on its material capacity.
135
 This is an essential point as the international community 
is risk-averse when it comes to the deployment of its resources for humanitarian 
interventions, as indicated in the literature review. The Libyan army had at its disposal 
around 530 tanks, 2840 infantry vehicles, 580 anti-air weapons and 480 aircrafts.
136
 Adequate 
information on Libya’s army enabled leading international community members, such as 
France and the UK, to more accurately assess the situation.  
It was earlier explained that the Libyan leadership was controversial and unpopular; 
domestically, regionally and internationally Gaddafi was isolated. Main reason for this is 
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often deemed the unpredictable behavior of Gaddafi and his proven support for terrorism. 
Since the late 1990s Gaddafi made serious reconciliation attempt, which were necessary to 
pull the technologically lagged oil industry out of the doldrums. In December 2003 it was 
announced that Libya would give up its weapons of mass destruction.
137
 This development 
was well-received, as US President Bush said: “Leaders who abandon the pursuit of 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will find an open 
path to better relations with the United States and free nations.”138 Broadly speaking the 
reconciliation attempts were only minor successes, as the outside world’s compliance seemed 
to have been driven by an interest in the Libyan oil-industry rather than forgiveness.
139
  
As discussed earlier, the antagonistic attitudes of countries as Russia and China with 
respect to the intervention in Libya were rooted in ideological differences with the West 
concerning sovereignty and interventionism, rather than in any affiliation for the Gaddafi 
regime.  
Gaddafi’s perceived ‘isolation from reality’ caused regional players, such as the Arab 
League and the African Union, to support the NTC and also the establishment of an 
intervention. Gaddafi was written off because of his support of ‘despots, bizarre foreign 
policy and general disrepute.’140 The interests of the regional players were just as well served 
by supporting a future Libyan regime. It was argued that the regional support for the NTC, 
which also translated into military support, increased the clashes between regime loyalists 
and regime opponents and thus the regional actors have played a significant role in the 
heightening of the conflict into civil war.
141
   
 
Within Libya, Gaddafi seemed similarly unpopular. The typical authoritarian combination of 
a luxurious lifestyle and a failure to let large parts of the population benefit from the 
country’s economic potential presumably contributed to this. Meanwhile, corruption and 
nepotism were widespread and concentrated the wealth around the elite. The high 
centralization of wealth required Gaddafi to similarly centralize power around himself and his 
entourage, thereby setting the pretext for the heavily isolated position in which he found 
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himself to be when the protests commenced.
142
 This isolated position is a key factor in 
understanding the vulnerability of the Qaddafi regime; when the Libyan conflict became the 
center of international attention, the Libyan elite soon crumbled as anti-Gaddafi sentiment 
prevailed domestically and internationally.   
The Libyan society was considered rather homogenous, as over 90 percent of the 
country’s population is Sunni Arab.143 As such, the intervening states gave little attention to 
the formation of a post-intervention strategy. Later the notion of Libyan population 
homogeneity was deemed a complete misapprehension as the Libyan society is divided along 
different lines. “The country is an amalgamation of three historically and geographically 
different regions with diverse ethnic, tribal and socio-cultural identities: Tripolitania in the 
west, Cyrenaica in the east and the Fezzan in the southwest.”144 The historical and geographic 
differences, and the resulting diverging identities, found no recognition under the Gaddafi 
regime.
145
 As such, different groups had a shared interest to depose of Gaddafi. The 
international community has arguably mistaken this marriage of convenience, which was 
merely based on the existence of a shared enemy, for homogeneity. The intervention in Libya 
was conducted without realizing the post-intervention challenges that such an intervention 
entailed.    
 
Syria: military capacity, regime support and the composition of society 
In terms of military capacity, an intervention in Syria should be seen as a much greater 
challenge. The Syrian army is large, powerful, well equipped by Russia, China and Iran, and 
presumably most important; it is highly motivated. As the al-Assad regime managed to 
modernize the military over time, there is limited clarity on the actual risk that it would pose 
with regards to an intervening party, which undeniably decreases the likelihood an 
intervention occurs.
146
 Estimates are that the Syrian military possesses over 4950 tanks, 6610 
infantry fighting vehicles, 3310 anti-air weapons and 830 aircrafts.
147
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An important feature to the Syrian conflict is its richness of stakeholders, which is 
mostly the result of its location in the tumultuous Middle Eastern region and the strong ties 
with Russia. Dealing with Syria means dealing with Hamas, Hezbollah, Russia and Iran.
148
 
As such, estimating the commitment that would be required for an intervention in Syria is 
troublesome but most would conclude that it is beyond any state’s intervention willingness at 
this point. 
Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was seen as an educated and reform-oriented politician 
at the time of his appointment; the Western hopes for positive reforms were high. The 
presence of corruption has done little damage to the position of al-Assad. The al-Assad 
family lives a life largely devoid of excessive luxury, thereby giving the opposition little to 
blackguard them of self-enrichment. As such, corruption is seen as a societal problem rather 
than a product of the regime’s governing. An import reason for the sustained support of the 
al-Assad regime, in spite of the violent crackdown on anti-regime forces, is that the regime 
enjoys the image of a beacon of stability in a fragmented country that would otherwise 
collapse. Al-Assad has exploited this image during the crisis and accused the West of 
controlling the rebels for the purpose of destabilizing Syria.
149
  
Many people in Syria seem to accept the regime’s repressive character in return for 
the stability and security that it has, before the conflict, proven to provide. Around 74 percent 
of the Syrian people are Sunni Muslim, 12 percent are Alawite, 10 percent are Christian and 3 
percent are Druze. The al-Assad family belongs to the Alawite minority and many anticipate 
that if the regime falls, the Sunni Muslim majority will take power and retaliate for decades 
of repression by the Alawite minority. In short, the regime is controversial for its repressive 
nature but celebrated for the stability and secularity that it brings. Especially the minorities 
fear the consequences of the Syrian swing to Islam that is expected to follow from a 
revolution.
150
  
Breaking down the Syrian society according to its religious dividing lines fails to 
grasp the complexity of the conflict. Dividing lines are crosscutting; the presence of different 
religions, ethnicities and nations further complicate the conflict. Witnessing from the outside, 
the international community sees sheer anarchy and struggles to identify who is fighting 
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whom in the war zone that Syria is today. This poor insight causes the international 
community to lack viable strategies for Syria’s future. An intervention without such a 
strategy is widely deemed to produce more chaos or facilitate the creation of just another 
dictatorship.
151
    
 
Findings: two different tales of perceived conflict complexity 
It was found that the Libyan military capacity was not an issue that impacted the intervention 
plans. The Libyan military was relatively weak, disloyal to the regime and the international 
community was informed about its capacity. The Libyan leadership was unpopular; both on 
the domestic and international level many preferred to see Gaddafi go. The reasons for his 
domestic isolation included his luxurious lifestyle and his unpredictable behavior. On the 
international level Gaddafi was never forgiven for the terrorist acts in the past and the 
regional organizations failed to see the benefit of having Gaddafi over not having Gaddafi. 
Finally, the intervention in Libya seems to have followed from a misapprehension with 
respect to the societal complexity. As such, the intervening parties failed to develop a post-
intervention strategy. However, for the analysis at hand it suffices to conclude that the 
perception of societal homogeneity contributed to intervention occurrence.  
 
In comparison to the Libya conflict, the Syrian conflict is deemed relatively complex. 
Militarily speaking, Syria poses a much greater threat to an intervening party; the Syrian 
army is large, well equipped and also motivated to serve the regime. Syria’s close relations to 
a number of key parties, among them Hamas, Hezbollah, Russia and Iran, protect it from an 
intervention. Interveners simply cannot estimate how far the loyalties of these allies go, and 
uncertainty is an important demotivating factor for the conduct of a humanitarian 
intervention. The al-Assad regime continues to enjoy support within segments of the Syrian 
society; a lack of political freedom is apparently a price people are willing to pay when their 
security is at stake. When not being ‘destabilized by foreign evil’, the Al-Assad regime 
provides such security. Finally, the international community lacks a strategy for future Syria, 
as it cannot grasp the conflict’s complexity. An intervening party would thus take on a burden 
of unknown difficulty and scope, which makes intervention occurrence highly unlikely.  
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The hypotheses concerning the role of perceived conflict complexity is confirmed as 
on all themes related to complexity, the findings correspond to the view of an ‘easier’ 
intervention in Libya and a ‘more difficult’ intervention in Syria.   
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7. Conclusions and recommendations 
The main question that this thesis sought to answer is why the Libyans were saved and the 
Syrians are not. In other words: why did the international community respond to the Libyan 
crisis by means of a humanitarian intervention, while it failed to conduct a similar 
intervention in response to the crisis in Syria?   
 Three hypotheses were tested on their capacity to explain the different international 
community responses. The first hypothesis addressed the impact of the UN Security 
Council’s task to provide authorization within a context of disputed legality of humanitarian 
interventions. It was concluded that the voting behavior of the UNSC members failed to 
correspond to the humanitarian necessity of such an intervention. In addition, actions related 
to the case of Libya have affected the positions on Syria, which is seen as an additional 
shortcoming with respect to the prioritization of humanitarian considerations. The second 
hypothesis tested for the impact of political and economic interests on humanitarian 
intervention behavior. It was found that especially the broader political interests of the great 
powers explained their positions with respect to intervening in Libya and Syria. Economic 
interests were at stake and may have played a role, but failed to convince as an explanation 
for the great power’s foreign policy. The third hypothesis tested for the impact of conflict 
complexity on intervention willingness. It was found that the different factors that influence 
perceived conflict complexity, the regimes’ military capacity, their domestic popularity and 
international level of support, and the differences in societal composition, all correspond to 
the different international community responses to the crises in Libya and Syria. In 
conclusion, all three hypotheses are confirmed, and the variables they investigated should all 
be seen as indispensible components of an inclusive explanation of why an intervention in 
Libya occurred and an intervention in Syria did not. Additional research should be conducted 
in order to see if more factors that were of influence could be discovered.  
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by responding to an important shortcoming 
within it, namely the scholarly propensity to either focus on theoretical contemplations that 
underlie humanitarian intervention decision-making or on the retrospective evaluation of 
intervention success. The decision-making process preceding a recently established 
intervention was compared with the decision-making that led to a policy of nonintervention. 
Thus, the research subjected an intervention policy and a nonintervention policy to equal 
treatment. The latter policy type, nonintervention, is largely underexposed in the research on 
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humanitarian intervention behavior and thus an incomplete picture results which only 
represents the considerations causing an intervention to be established, failing to include the 
factors that cause states or alliances of states to refrain from intervention. 
 
The study needed to make some inevitable compromises. Due to the complexity of factors 
and actors at play within the topic of humanitarian interventions, the research relied on 
theoretical foundations that were obtained from the existing literature. Thus, existing 
explanations were applied to novel theories, rather than that theory was developed from the 
outset. In essence this is not viewed as a disadvantage as the use of existing theories delivers 
insightful conclusions on the status of the current scholarly debate. The confirmation of all 
three hypotheses indicates that the contemporary theoretical explanations for factors of 
influence for intervention behavior are adequate. However, additional research is 
recommended in order to learn more about how cases of humanitarian intervention either 
materialized or not, affect one another. It was found that the so-called ‘mission creep’, 
referring to the Russian and Chinese accusation of UNSC mandate exceeding in Libya, 
significantly changed position on the Syria crisis. Additional research should investigate how 
the effect of this reciprocity relates to the existing explanations for intervention behavior.  
 
The international community has, in spite of the perhaps slow but continuous modernization 
of the international legal framework, not found a way of dealing with intra-state conflicts 
whereby the highest priority is given to the humanitarian needs of the victims. Instead, 
whether or not people are saved depends on the position of the great powers in the UNSC and 
their ability to overcome the ideological issues that divide them.   
An interesting question that arises is if the control over the conduct of humanitarian 
interventions should be concentrated around just five countries, or if an alternative system is 
thinkable. Researchers could deliver a valuable contribution by investigating the possibility 
of a system that does not rely on the great powers as much and that minimizes the possibility 
for misuse of the humanitarian label.  
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Annex 
Figure 1: Libyan export of crude oil at the time of the outbreak of the conflict.   
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Figure 2: Libyan export of crude oil at the time of the outbreak of the conflict.   
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